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Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan
Social security privatization with individual accounts and employer-
provided defi ned contribution systems shift responsibility for invest-
ment decisions to individual workers. With social security privatization, 
workers usually have some choice as to how the money in their indi-
vidual accounts is invested. The choices workers make can have an 
important effect on their levels of retirement income. By comparison, 
in traditional social security and pension systems, fewer burdens for
decision-making responsibility are placed on individual workers. In-
stead, decisions regarding fi nancial management of investments are 
made by fi nancial professionals. A further distinction is that in tradi-
tional defi ned benefi t plans workers do not bear fi nancial market risk, 
while in privatized defi ned contribution plans workers do bear this risk. 
This raises the issue of how to communicate to workers who are fi nan-
cially unsophisticated to the possible consequences of fi nancial market 
risk.
Proponents of social security privatization and defi ned contribution 
systems argue that workers are capable of learning about fi nancial mar-
kets and investments and making good fi nancial decisions. Traditional 
economics, which assumes well-informed, rational decision makers, 
supports that position. Behavioral economics, however, focuses on the 
diffi culties that many workers have making fi nancial decisions. Many 
workers are not interested in, and some are not capable of, learning the 
fi nancial information needed to adequately manage an individual ac-
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count. In addition, the market for fi nancial services is more complex 
and less transparent than most other markets for goods and services 
(Rajnes 2003).
In part because of problems clients have encountered when they 
seek fi nancial advice, trust in fi nancial services is at a low level. A 
recent survey in the EU fi nds that many people mistrust pension and 
investment services, ranking 50th among the services surveyed and 
ranking lower in trust than the market for used cars or for gambling 
(KPMG 2011).
In this chapter, we discuss fi nancial literacy and fi nancial advice 
as weak links in social security privatization and employer-provided 
defi ned contribution systems. They cause programs to take on added 
expenses to try to reduce the effects of worker investment errors and 
bad advice. Widespread fi nancial education has become a necessary 
part of social security privatization. 
We begin by discussing the lack of fi nancial literacy and some of 
the types of errors that workers make in managing individual account 
pensions. We document that lack of fi nancial literacy is widespread in 
a number of countries. We then discuss in turn fi nancial education and 
fi nancial advice as possible responses. Financial education is often seen 
to have limited success, in part because of a lack of interest by work-
ers. This discussion is followed by commentary on problems that have
arisen with fi nancial advice, including legal issues that arise when ad-
visers do not have a fi duciary duty to act in the best interest of their 
clients. We explain how the structure and level of advisory fees may re-
sult in confl icts of interest that may affect the quality of advice provided 
to individuals. Then we explain how laws and regulations are evolving 
in different countries in response to the confl icts of interest. We offer 
conclusions in a fi nal section.
ERRORS INVESTORS MAKE
Making investment decisions is a complex process that requires an 
understanding of risk diversifi cation as well as knowledge about differ-
ent types of investments. A recent U.S. survey fi nds that 34 percent of 
investors were “overwhelmed” by the options facing them (Cornfi eld 
up14msssapch14.indd   300 1/31/2014   10:45:27 AM
Financial Literacy, Education, and Advice   301
2012). Another study fi nds that only 31 percent of U.S. workers are 
confi dent in their ability to manage their investments during retirement 
(Yakoboski 2005). A Canadian study fi nds that workers rated choosing 
the right investment for their individual account pension plan (RRSP 
plan in Canada) as more stressful than seeing the dentist (Canadian 
Press 2005). 
While traditional economic theory assumes that investors do not 
make systematic errors, increasingly economic theory, using insights 
from behavioral economics, suggests otherwise (Turner 2003). Pension 
participants make at least three types of investment errors: 1) insuf-
fi cient diversifi cation of their investment portfolios, 2) inappropriate 
level of risk holdings in their investment portfolios, and 3) inappropriate 
portfolio adjustments, for example, in response to a market downturn. 
With insuffi cient diversifi cation, participants in some individual ac-
count systems purchase investment funds that are too narrowly focused 
on a particular segment of the investment market. For example, one 
study of U.S. defi ned contribution plan participants fi nds that most held 
either no equities (48 percent) or only equities (22 percent) in their port-
folios, rather than diversifying (Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén 2003). 
Thus, with inappropriate levels of risk holdings, some investors hold 
investment portfolios that are either too conservative or too risky. With 
inappropriate portfolio adjustments, some investors tend to chase re-
turns, purchasing the mutual funds that have risen and selling those 
that have fallen in value. A further error may be lack of sensitivity to 
fees, causing pension participants to spend too much in fees (Hastings, 
Mitchell, and Chyn 2011).
Sweden has attempted to provide investment information to the 
participants of its privatized social security system. Survey results con-
cerning the mandatory individual account system in Sweden, where 
workers can choose from more than 600 mutual funds (Turner 2004), 
suggest that some participants may have been confused about their par-
ticipation in the investment process. While 18 percent actually chose 
their investments (rather than taking the default), 34 percent thought 
they had (Betson 2001). Another Swedish survey indicated that of 
those Swedes who made a choice, 73 percent could not name all the 
funds they had invested in, and 41 percent could not name any of them 
(Jarvenpaa 2001).
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A World Bank survey of the privatized social security systems in 
Latin America fi nds that workers and retirees encountered problems 
in making a number of decisions required of them by those systems 
(Devesa-Carpio and Vidal-Meliá 2002). These decisions extend beyond 
simply making investment decisions regarding the composition of their 
investment portfolios. They had diffi culty choosing a pension fund 
management company, deciding whether to make additional contribu-
tions, whether to switch into the privatized system (when that choice 
was open to them), what form to receive benefi ts (phased withdrawal, 
annuity), and choosing a life insurance company to provide an annuity. 
The errors participants make can be due to their lack of information 
when making investment decisions. Lack of information can include 
lack of knowledge about investing and lack of information about stock 
markets. Pension participants may lack information for fi nancial de-
cision making because of both the amount of information they have 
assimilated and the amount available to them. As a result of govern-
ment or employer attempts to overcome the lack of information, some 
workers may suffer from the opposite problem—information overload 
(Agnew and Szykman 2004). They may have too much information, 
which also causes diffi culties for workers when attempting to make in-
vestment decisions. 
FINANCIAL LITERACY
A major reason why pension participants make investment errors 
may be a lack of fi nancial literacy. Many do not have basic fi nancial 
knowledge, lacking an understanding of fi nancial terms and how fi nan-
cial markets work. For example, studies generally show that people do 
not know what happens to bond prices when interest rates rise (Lusardi 
2006). In another survey in the United States, only a third of respon-
dents correctly answered three questions about infl ation, interest rates, 
and risk diversifi cation (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006). Many people 
may not understand commonly used fi nancial market jargon, such as 
“equity.” A survey of pension participants fi nds that 10 percent did not 
know what the word fund meant (Russell 2012).
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Causes of Financial Illiteracy
Numeracy is an aspect of fi nancial literacy; it is the ability to ap-
ply simple mathematical concepts. One example of a lack of numeracy 
is exponential growth bias, which results in a lack of understanding 
of compound interest. Studies have shown that many people have a 
tendency to do linear (straight line) projections of growth of account 
balances, rather than exponential (upward curved) projections that are 
the result of compound interest. For this reason, they underestimate the 
benefi ts of saving because they underestimate its future value (Stango 
and Zinman 2009).
Literacy is a basic skill needed for fi nancial literacy. A study in the 
United Kingdom fi nds that one-fi fth of young persons aged 16–19 have 
low levels of literacy (17 percent) and numeracy (22 percent), making 
it diffi cult for them to function in the labor market (Shepherd 2010). 
These people would also have diffi culty dealing with issues relating 
to investments. Data from the World Bank indicate that small minori-
ties of people are illiterate in some countries that have privatized their 
social security systems. For example, the literacy rate in El Salvador 
is 84 percent, in Peru it is 90 percent, and in Mexico it is 93 percent. 
These rates are high compared to some poor African countries, such as 
Ethiopia (World Bank 2012). In the United States, the state of Alabama 
has an adult literacy rate of 85 percent (National Center for Educational 
Statistics 2012).
Prevalence of Financial Illiteracy
In some countries with generous traditional social security systems, 
fi nancial literacy is not a major policy issue. Countries where the re-
tirement system relies on defi ned contribution plans, either as part of 
privatized social security or as voluntary plans, place a greater burden 
of fi nancial literacy on their workers. A study of fi nancial literacy in 
28 countries fi nds that, according to its measure, the leading countries 
for fi nancial literacy are Brazil, Mexico, Australia, United States, and 
Canada (Ribeiro 2012). Nearly all of these countries place heavy reli-
ance on defi ned contribution plans. 
Even in countries that rank relatively high in fi nancial literacy, many 
people lack basic fi nancial knowledge. For example, a study in Canada 
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fi nds that 16 percent participating in an employer-provided pension 
plan did not know whether the plan was an individual account (defi ned 
contribution) or traditional pension (defi ned benefi t) plan (Schellenberg 
and Ostrovsky 2008). A study in the United States fi nds that fewer than 
one-third of young adults had basic knowledge about risk diversifi ca-
tion, interest rates, and infl ation (Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto 2010). In 
the United States, studies document that many workers lack basic fi nan-
cial knowledge (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2006; McCarthy and Turner 
2000). For example, surveys have found that many people do not know 
that they are paying fees for the management of the investments in their 
defi ned contribution plans (Turner and Korczyk 2004). Studies have 
indicated that a lack of fi nancial literacy is prevalent in many countries. 
International research demonstrates that many workers lack fi nancial 
literacy in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, Italy, New Zea-
land, and the United States (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
Gender plays a role in the lack of fi nancial literacy—women on av-
erage are less fi nancially literate than men (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
Reasons for this could include a division of labor in some households, 
where men take responsibility for fi nancial decisions, or it could be that 
women are less confi dent in dealing with numbers. The groups who are 
the least fi nancially literate also are those who are the most fi nancially 
vulnerable—minorities, women, and people with low levels of educa-
tion and income (Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn 2011). Thus, those most 
in need of fi nancial skills to deal with a privatized social security sys-
tem are the least well-equipped, making them even more vulnerable.
Chile is a leader of the social security privatization movement, hav-
ing privatized its social security system in 1981. In Chile, according 
to the 2009 Social Protection Survey, 94 percent of respondents indi-
cated that they did not know anything about the pension options that 
existed (IOPS 2011). This lack of knowledge existed even though the 
pension system had been in existence for more than 25 years. A study 
in Chile fi nds that workers with lower levels of fi nancial literacy and 
lower education and income tend to rely on their employers, coworkers, 
and friends more than on cost fundamentals in choosing a pension fund 
(Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn 2011). As a result, they may make poor 
fund choices that adversely affect their retirement security. 
One problem for people with low levels of fi nancial literacy is that 
people tend to think they know more than they do. For example, in an 
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Australian survey, 67 percent indicated that they understood compound 
interest, but only 28 percent were able to determine the correct answer 
to a problem involving that concept (OECD 2006). Before governments 
can successfully provide fi nancial education, they need to convince 
workers that they need it.
FINANCIAL EDUCATION
Growth
The growth in fi nancial education provided by governments and 
employers in a number of countries is a direct result of the increas-
ing importance of defi ned contribution plans as voluntary or mandatory 
parts of retirement income systems. Financial education can cover such 
topics as investment terminology, asset allocation, risk tolerance, and 
retirement goal setting (Olsen and Whitman 2007). The cost of fi nan-
cial education becomes one of the costs of social security privatization, 
though it often is not included in studies that compare the advantages of 
privatized to traditional social security programs and compute the rates 
of return in privatized systems. Using fi nancial education to address 
the lack of fi nancial literacy of pension participants is not a quick fi x; it 
needs to be a long-term and sustained effort, which can be quite costly 
(Ashcroft and Stewart 2010).
Several international organizations, such as the OECD and the Inter-
national Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS 2011), have taken 
an interest in fi nancial education for pension participants in individual 
account pension systems. In 2008, the OECD created the International 
Network on Financial Education. 
A survey by IOPS (2011) found that 16 out of 19 fi nancial supervi-
sors of pension systems provided some type of fi nancial education. The 
pension supervisors not providing fi nancial education tend to be fairly 
young, with intentions of providing fi nancial education in the future. In 
Chile, the pension supervisory authority has a specifi c budget set aside 
for fi nancial education (Ashcroft and Stewart 2010). Chile has launched 
several initiatives to encourage fi nancial literacy, and in Mexico, the 
pension supervisory authority has undertaken a comprehensive pro-
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gram of fi nancial education (IOPS 2011). This program has provided 
fi nancial education not only to workers and those nearing retirement, 
but also to school children. In the United States, 13 out of the 50 states 
require that children in secondary (high) school are required to take a 
class in personal fi nance (Malcolm 2012). 
In 2009, more than 20 U.S. federal government agencies had 
programs aimed at improving fi nancial literacy (U.S. Government Ac-
countability Offi ce 2011). One of the often overlooked aspects of these 
programs is their cost, as they are funded with general government tax 
revenues. 
Along with fi nancial education, there has been an increased focus 
on the content of periodic statements provided to pension participants, 
which is part of an effort to improve communication. These statements 
are being used to attempt to improve the fi nancial literacy of partici-
pants and their understanding of their pension plans. However, there is 
little consensus as to what information, beyond basic account informa-
tion, should be provided and how. In particular, there is no consensus as 
to whether projections of possible future account balances should be in-
cluded and how they should be calculated so as to indicate the possible 
effects of fi nancial market risk. Communicating to pension participants 
about risk is a diffi cult and unresolved aspect of fi nancial education 
(Antolin and Harrison 2012).
Effectiveness
In the United States, fi nancial education often occurs at the work-
place. Evidence suggests that fi nancial education programs have had 
some success in helping people who participate in them make better 
decisions concerning saving for retirement (Hathaway and Kahtiwada 
2008). Studies of workplace fi nancial education programs have shown 
improved fi nancial literacy after taking the programs (Clark, Morrill, 
and Allen 2012). These results, however, may be affected to some ex-
tent by selection bias in that positive results are found for programs for 
people who voluntarily participate because of their interest in learning 
about the subject. Some studies show limited effects of fi nancial edu-
cation, which may be in part because the fi nancial education provided 
was of limited duration, such as a one-time presentation. Also, some 
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people have diffi culty following through on their intentions for making 
changes following fi nancial education (Lusardi 2006).
Studies indicate that many people are not interested in fi nancial 
education. One U.S. survey fi nds that 56 percent of employees did not 
review the educational material provided by their pension plans. In 
that survey, 52 percent said that they do not have the time, interest, or 
knowledge to manage their 401(k) plan adequately (Gray 2012). These 
results indicate that provision of information alone is insuffi cient to 
deal with problems of fi nancial literacy.
The effectiveness of fi nancial education may depend in part on de-
tails as to how it is presented, with behavioral economics providing 
insights as to effective methods. A study of Chilean workers (Hastings, 
Mitchell, and Chyn 2011) fi nds that framing investment information 
relating to investment choices as gains rather than losses had a large 
effect on the way the information was perceived, particularly by people 
with lower levels of education.
TRANSPARENCY
An alternative to dealing with problems of fi nancial literacy is to 
make fi nancial products more transparent in their features and costs. Of-
ten, pension participants and other investors do not understand the fees 
they are paying (Turner and Korczyk 2004). A lack of understanding 
about fees may in part be the result of a lack of transparency. In addition, 
attempts can be made to standardize fi nancial products, simplify them, 
and limit their possible features so as to facilitate comparability across 
fi nancial products (Inderst and Ottaviani 2012). A further approach is to 
standardize disclosure, to make it easier for clients to compare costs and 
risks across fi nancial products. In addition, attempts have been made to 
assure that disclosures are made in “plain English,” that is, that they are 
written in language that is comprehensible by people with low levels of 
education.
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DEFAULTS
Transparency and fi nancial education, however, rarely are suf-
fi cient to deal with the problems many participants face when given 
the responsibility for managing their investments (Ashcroft and Stew-
art 2010). One way of dealing with the lack of interest in and lack of 
knowledge of about fi nancial market issues of some participants in 
privatized social security systems is to establish defaults that provide 
reasonable outcomes for workers opting out of the decision-making 
process. Studies have shown that defaults can have a major impact on 
pension participants in some circumstances (Choi et al. 2002; Madrian 
and Shea 2001). Sweden has a default investment in its mandatory in-
dividual account system for people not choosing an investment (Turner 
2004). Australia has also established a system of investment defaults 
for its mandatory individual account system (Muir 2012). 
Defaults are a form of implicit advice, incorporating decision-
making outcomes that experts view as desirable. With defaults, individ-
uals who lack interest or knowledge in making fi nancial decisions rely 
on the default investments to be a reasonable option. In addition, others 
who are knowledgeable may accept the default as a form of advice.
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
The traditional policy approach to affect people’s behavior is 
through fi nancial incentives. Individuals do have fi nancial incentives 
to overcome fi nancial illiteracy and make effective investment deci-
sions, because doing so would presumably improve their investment 
decisions and ultimately the amount of money they had accumulated 
at retirement. However, it seems that the incentives are not suffi cient to 
have much effect on behavior. This may be due in part to the lack of a 
clear connection between achieving fi nancial literacy and the fi nancial 
rewards from doing so.
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BANNING SOME PRODUCTS OR PRACTICES
Another approach to protecting unsophisticated investors is to 
ban certain fi nancial products or practices. For example, in the United 
States, fi nancial advisers are not permitted to charge fees based on the 
performance of the clients’ portfolios, except for wealthy clients who 
are presumably sophisticated investors. Similarly, in the United States 
participants in defi ned contribution plans and Individual Retirement 
Accounts are prohibited from making certain investments, such as us-
ing their pension funds to purchase a home, short selling, or investing 
in collectibles, such as art work. 
FINANCIAL ADVICE
Because of a lack of interest and engagement among some workers, 
there has been limited success with fi nancial education. Therefore, at-
tention has also focused on providing fi nancial advice. While fi nancial 
education provides general information about investments and fi nan-
cial markets, fi nancial advice provides specifi c suggestions as to what 
investments to make. The use of advisers allows for specialization and 
economies of scale in the acquisition of fi nancial skills and knowledge. 
With advisers, not everyone needs to become an expert. Financial ex-
pertise can be a specialized skill rather than one that is generally held. 
However, workers with low fi nancial literacy may be vulnerable to ex-
ploitation through bad advice when the adviser can profi t by steering 
clients to more expensive options. 
Financial advisers can assist clients in several ways. They can 
provide fi nancial advice, fi nancial education, decision support, and mar-
keting information, and they can manage the individual’s investments. 
Decision support is education targeted to help a client reach a decision. 
Marketing information may appear to the client to be unbiased advice 
but is designed to sell a product. Many advisers assist their clients in 
carrying out their advice. If they provide fi nancial management, they 
make investment decisions and carry them out, generally without in-
volving the individual investor in the decision (Turner and Muir 2012).
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Problems with Financial Advice
 Workers seeking fi nancial advice concerning investment decisions 
may encounter problems relating to the advice they receive, including 
the use of jargon and confusing terminology relating to fees, lack of 
knowledge about the client’s goals and risk tolerance, lack of disclosure 
about fees, confl icts of interest of fi nancial advisers that affect the qual-
ity of advice, lack of fi duciary protection against confl icts of interest, 
and a problem called “hat switching.” With hat switching, a fi nancial 
adviser has different levels of responsibility to the client depending 
on the circumstances. For example, under some circumstances in the 
United States advisers are required to provide advice in the best interest 
of their clients, while in other circumstances they are only required to 
provide advice that is suitable for their clients. For a fi nancial adviser 
to provide quality advice, he must have some knowledge of the goals 
and risk tolerance of the client. This issue is sometimes formalized in 
“know your client requirements” that establish minimum standards for 
advisers concerning information they obtain from their clients. 
Financial advisers have confl icts of interest when they have a fi -
nancial stake in the advice that they provide. For example, that occurs 
if the adviser receives greater compensation when he recommends in-
vestments with higher fees for the recipient of the advice. If the adviser 
is also a salesperson, he will probably advise purchasing the fi nancial 
products he sells rather than other products. 
Information that fi nancial advisers provide to participants can be 
tainted by confl icts of interest that the advisers have. Mutual funds, 
for example, often provide information about investing, but rarely does 
that information include the advice to determine how much the person 
is paying in fees, and to look for low-cost providers and funds. Lack of 
knowledge about fees charged can lead to participants paying higher 
fees than if they were better informed. 
Part of the problem arising from confl icts of interest is that fi nancial 
advisers do not have a fi duciary duty to their clients in some countries. 
For example, in the United States stockbrokers generally do not have a 
fi duciary duty to their clients when they advise them. Financial advis-
ers have a clear information advantage over their clients that they can 
exploit for their gain when they do not have a fi duciary duty to act in 
the best interest of their clients. This may result in agency costs, which 
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clients incur when an agent does not act in the best interest of the cli-
ent. Agency costs can include the client paying higher fees, taking on 
greater risk, and having too much trading of their portfolio (churning). 
A lack of both educational standards for advisers and uniform certifi ca-
tion requirements, combined with insuffi cient regulation of confl icts of 
interest, prevent fi nancial advisers from achieving the quality expected 
of an advice professional. 
An audit study in the United States has documented a number of prob-
lems with the fi nancial advice that clients receive (Mullainathan, Noeth, 
and Schoar 2012). The study fi nds that advisers push for actively man-
aged portfolios with high fees, even if clients start with well-diversifi ed 
portfolios with low fees, and that fi nancial advisers tend to profi t from 
investor errors. For example, some investors sell during downturns and 
buy during upturns, known as “chasing returns.” Rather than “debiasing” 
their clients, some advisers support that strategy, presumably because it 
involves greater sales commissions for themselves, even though it results 
in worse outcomes for their clients. 
Australia has recognized the importance of pension participants re-
ceiving quality fi nancial advice in its system of mandatory individual 
accounts. It recently commissioned a study where it rated the quality of 
fi nancial advice that people received. Out of 64 cases reviewed, only 
two people received what was considered to be high-quality fi nancial 
advice. The majority (37 people) received adequate advice, while a 
signifi cant minority (25 people) received poor quality advice. People 
receiving poor advice received advice that was inappropriate for their 
situation. Forty-two percent of people do not trust fi nancial advisers and 
would not follow their recommendations (Kell 2012). Most people are 
not capable of judging whether the advice they are receiving is good. In 
the Australian study, most people who received poor advice thought that 
they had received good advice (Kell 2012). People may have diffi culty 
assessing the quality of advice they receive. Nonetheless, according to a 
survey by the Investor Protection Trust, about 20 percent of adults aged 
65 or older in the United States report having “been taken advantage of 
fi nancially in terms of an inappropriate investment, unreasonably high 
fees for fi nancial services, or outright fraud” (Infogroup/ORC 2010). 
A study conducted in Singapore concerning the quality of fi nan-
cial advice received by “mystery shoppers,” people who took part in 
the study, fi nds that frequently fi nancial advisers did not obtain enough 
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information from their clients to make suitable recommendations (Mon-
etary Authority of Singapore 2012). For example, less than half asked 
about the clients’ risk preferences. The study also fi nds that fees were 
not disclosed or discussed in nearly half of the cases. In 28 percent of 
the cases, the advice was judged to be suitable by independent fi nancial 
experts, in 40 percent the advice might be suitable, and in 28 percent the 
advice was not suitable for the clients’ needs.
Financial advice can provide a valuable service to clients. How-
ever, a U.S. survey fi nds that 83 percent of those surveyed indicated that 
they would be interested in receiving professional assistance in manag-
ing their 401(k) plans, but only 10 percent took advantage of that option 
when it was offered (Gray 2012).
Effects of Financial Advice
Several studies have examined the effects of advice. Hung and 
Yoong (2012) examine survey data relating to defi ned contribution 
plan participants to study whether advice resulted in improved results. 
They fi nd little evidence of improved results. In an experiment, they 
fi nd some evidence that unsolicited advice was ineffective, but when 
participants actively solicited advice the advice resulted in improved 
outcomes. Employees with low levels of fi nancial literacy were more 
likely to solicit advice and to benefi t from the advice.
Because of confl icts of interest, recipients of advice may actually 
have worse outcomes than those not receiving advice. A study in Ger-
many of bank customers who used a fi nancial adviser compensated 
through commissions fi nds that the portfolios of those customers who 
used a fi nancial adviser had lower rates of return net of costs (Hack-
enthal, Haliassos, and Japelli 2011). Similarly, a U.S. study fi nds that 
mutual funds recommended by fi nancial advisers underperformed other 
mutual funds on a risk-adjusted basis, taking into account fees (Berg-
stresser, Chalmers, and Tufano 2009).
Financial Advice Reforms
A number of countries are considering the issues of the quality of 
fi nancial advice and its cost, and are considering reforms that would 
increase consumer protection. 
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United States. The U.S. Department of Labor is working on pro-
posed regulations to improve the quality of advice to pension plan 
participants. Proposals have been made to extend fi duciary standards 
that apply to investment advisers and brokers.
United Kingdom. In order to improve the quality of advice, the 
UK has made it illegal for advisers to receive commissions for selling 
products to clients. Advisers who sell products tend to recommend the 
products they sell, which may not be the best products for particular 
clients. Instead, advisers will be required to charge their clients fees for 
their services, which will reduce confl icts of interest. It will have the 
further advantage that the compensation advisers receive will be more 
transparent. This reform is being made because the receipt of commis-
sions has been viewed as a root cause of the pension misselling scandal 
in the UK. Previously, fi nancial advisers receiving commissions for 
making recommendations concerning pensions to clients had an obliga-
tion to make recommendations in the best interest of the client, but it 
had become clear that because of commissions that approach was not 
working. 
One criticism of banning commissions is that a single fee paid at the 
time of the advice may be too expensive for some clients, effectively 
preventing them from receiving advice. If the upfront fees are too ex-
pensive for a client to pay at one time, advisers in the UK are permitted 
to spread the fee charged over a period of time (BBC 2010).
An additional new requirement in the UK is that advisers will be 
required to tell their clients if their advice is independent, meaning that 
they provide advice over a full range of investment options, or if it is 
restricted, meaning that the advice they provide is only over a limited 
range of investments options, such as the options provided by the com-
pany they work for (Osborne 2010).
In addition, as of the end of 2012, a new agency in the UK, the 
Financial Conduct Authority, will be responsible for protecting con-
sumers in fi nancial markets. A regulatory issue this agency will face is 
the trade-off between protecting some consumers from detriment by not 
permitting certain risky investment products, while limiting the choice 
of others.
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Australia. Australia is implementing legislation to improve the 
quality of advice (Kell 2012). To address problems associated with 
fi nancial advice, Australia has instituted the Future of Financial Ad-
vice (FoFA) reform, which takes effect in July 2013. By eliminating 
commissions for advisers, the reform eliminates the problem of “hat 
switching,” which occurs when an adviser receives fees for advice but 
also receives commissions depending on what he advises that the cli-
ent purchases. In addition, advisers have a statutory requirement to act 
in the best interest of their clients, which is commonly considered to 
be a fi duciary duty. Thus, when they recommend a fi nancial product, 
they will have the duty to recommend the product that is in the best 
interest of their client, not the one that is merely suitable. Also, the 
reform attempts to improve the transparency of fees. When advisers 
provide ongoing advice, they will be required to renew their fee agree-
ments with clients every two years. In addition, the reforms attempt to 
facilitate the provision of “scaled” advice, which would be advice on 
a limited set of issues, rather than a full-scale review of their fi nancial 
situation. 
The Netherlands. The Netherlands Minister of Finance is consid-
ering legislation to improve the quality of advice, including requiring 
that every adviser have a college degree, that there be more emphasis on 
continuing education for fi nancial advisers, and that examination ques-
tions for advisers’ certifi cation correspond more to the actual situations 
for which they provide advice (Schlingmann, Schutte, and Somsen 
2012).
Singapore. Singapore is considering reforms of the way fi nancial 
advice is provided. The Singapore regulator has already introduced lim-
its on fees (KPMG 2011).
India. India has banned load fees charged on purchases of invest-
ment products (KPMG 2011).
While a number of countries are taking steps to increase the avail-
ability of unbiased fi nancial advice to pension participants, the question 
remains whether implementing costly reforms will help participants in 
terms of improving pension outcomes. 
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LEGAL ISSUES
As the foregoing discussion indicates, countries around the world 
face similar issues when structuring a legal framework intended to 
increase access to fi nancial advice while also ensuring that advice is 
not degraded by confl icts of interest, fraud, or misrepresentation of the 
adviser’s qualifi cations. Examples also exist to illustrate the potential 
legal issues that result when a population is not fi nancially literate. 
Misselling in the United Kingdom
In the late 1980s, UK citizens were permitted to choose more in-
dividualized pensions, known as personal pensions, where they could 
select the pension provider rather than participate in the public pension 
scheme or a scheme offered by their employers. Insurance companies 
and fi nancial advisers aggressively sold personal pensions without 
complying with the regulations that required them to understand the 
risk preferences and fi nancial positions of their customers. A study 
commissioned after the misselling came to the attention of regulators, 
who concluded that the lack of regulatory compliance was widespread 
(Muir 2009).
The misselling caused many employees who bought personal pen-
sions to be worse off than if they would have stayed in their employers’ 
occupational scheme. At least at the time, the benefi ts formulas of occu-
pational schemes tended to result in higher benefi ts than the investment 
returns on the personal pensions. Also, only employees (not employers) 
contributed to personal pensions. In comparison, employers typically 
did contribute to occupational schemes. So, the employees who were 
sold personal pensions forfeited their employers’ contributions and re-
ceived lower returns on the money they personally contributed (Muir 
2009).
Some experts held both the fi nancial services industry and the regu-
latory system to blame for the misselling scandal. The fi nancial services 
industry provided compensation incentives for their sales forces to mar-
ket personal pensions. This illustrates the potential effects of confl icts 
of interest, particularly when a new market opens up because of a rapid 
shift in a country’s retirement funding paradigm. At the same time, 
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regulators had little experience with the products being sold and the 
marketing techniques being used because of the shift in the paradigm to 
increase employee choice (Muir 2009). 
Australia’s Attention to Defaults
Australia does not have any history of shifting its government-run 
social insurance scheme to a privatization model. However, there is 
a sense in which there is a shadow privatization scheme in existence. 
Australia’s government-run system, known as the Age Pension, is a 
pay-as-you-go pension program that is both means and asset tested. 
Australia also has a mandatory employment-based system, known as 
the Superannuation Guarantee (SG System), which requires employ-
ers to contribute 9 percent of most income for most employees to an 
individual account (Muir 2011). Because the Age Pension is means and 
asset tested, retirees with higher SG System account balances are less 
likely to qualify for the Age Pension. Thus, there is a sense in which the 
SG System is a privatized Age Pension for those fortunate enough to 
accumulate substantial account balances.
In 2010, a panel constituted by the Australian government to study 
the SG System released its report, which has come to be known as the 
Cooper Report. The two-part report addresses many perceived defi cien-
cies in the SG System and made recommendations for improvement. 
The panel’s fi ndings on the importance of defaults are of particular 
interest here. The panel determined that having a fi nancially literate 
population as a long-term goal would be useful. But, critical to the 
Cooper Report’s recommendation is its fi nding that shorter-term issues 
could not be resolved through education and fi nancial literacy. Instead, 
it based its recommendation for a low-cost, more heavily regulated de-
fault system on the principle that not all members of the SG System are 
able or want to be involved in investment selection. Australia is cur-
rently in the process of moving toward the “MySuper” default product 
recommended in the Cooper Report (Muir 2011).
Regulation of Investment Advice in the United States
The United States has not moved to privatize Social Security, al-
though as noted earlier such privatization has been considered. The 
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issues of fi nancial literacy and fi nancial advice, however, have become 
more important as the population ages, as the United States becomes 
increasingly reliant on a defi ned contribution paradigm, and as the twin 
problems of high unemployment and a volatile stock market challenge 
retirement wealth creation. 
A detailed discussion of the U.S. regulatory structure that applies 
to mutual funds, investment advice, brokers, and related fi nancial 
services industry entities is beyond the scope of this chapter. At its es-
sence, the complexities derive from two sources. The fi rst is the state 
government and federal government dichotomy. Each state has some 
regulatory power over fi nancial services industry entities that are active 
in the state. The federal government effectively has regulatory authority 
over all fi nancial services entities. In some instances a state or multiple 
states may impose higher standards than imposed by the federal regula-
tors. In others, the federal regulations may be more strict than those of 
the states. The second set of complexities results from the way regula-
tory power is allocated within a state and particularly at the federal 
level. The primary division of power at the federal level is between the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Employee Benefi ts 
Security Administration (EBSA). The SEC’s mandate is to focus on 
investor protection. EBSA is charged with overseeing the regulation of 
private-sector employer-based retirement plans, including defi ned con-
tribution plans (Turner and Muir 2012).
Over the past two years, the most controversial regulatory issue of 
import for this chapter has been whether the SEC or EBSA will apply 
fi duciary obligations to a larger set of fi nancial services entities and 
individuals. EBSA proposed regulations to accomplish that in 2010 
and—after congressional hearings, widespread publicity, and signifi -
cant industry concern—withdrew the proposed regulations in 2011. 
Reportedly efforts continue to revise the proposed regulations for reis-
sue. In response to a legislative requirement, the SEC staff studied the 
differing levels of client obligation discussed above, from fi duciary to 
suitability, as well as the hat-switching problem. In a report issued in 
2011, the SEC staff recommended adoption of a single federal fi duciary 
standard that would apply to brokers as well as investment advisers. 
The costs and benefi ts of such an approach remain under study (Turner 
and Muir 2012).
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CONCLUSION
An aspect of social security privatization and employer-provided 
defi ned contribution systems that raises their costs is that they place 
greater responsibility on workers for making fi nancial decisions. They 
shift fi nancial decision-making from professionals to individual work-
ers. Proponents of privatization and defi ned contribution systems argue 
that workers should be capable of making these decisions, while oppo-
nents argue that many workers lack interest in acquiring the necessary 
knowledge. Studies have documented widespread fi nancial illiteracy in 
many countries, with this issue being more important in countries with 
privatized social security systems. While lack of literacy and numeracy 
are causes of lack of fi nancial literacy, fi nancial literacy rates are con-
siderably lower than literacy rates. Furthermore, fi nancial illiteracy is 
most prevalent among people who are already economically vulner-
able—women, minorities, and those with less education and income. 
The requirements for fi nancial literacy placed on them by privatized 
social security systems only increase their economic vulnerability.
Financial education has been the focus of efforts to deal with fi -
nancial illiteracy, but studies have documented that it often has limited 
success, perhaps because many workers are not interested. Some pro-
grams of fi nancial education may have been ineffective because they 
have been of limited duration. In addition, some workers have had dif-
fi culty following through on changes that they intended to implement 
following fi nancial education. Thus, while some programs have suc-
ceeded in improving fi nancial knowledge, they have done less well in 
changing fi nancial behavior.
The limited effectiveness of fi nancial education shifts the focus in 
some countries to issues of fi nancial advice. Workers seeking fi nancial 
advice, however, have encountered a number of problems, the most sig-
nifi cant of which perhaps is confl icts of interest that fi nancial advisers 
may have, combined with not having a fi duciary duty to act in the best 
interest of their clients. Confl icts of interest arise because of the ways 
that the compensation of advisers is determined. For example, a fi nan-
cial adviser may receive higher compensation when he recommends a 
fi nancial product that charges higher fees to the recipient of the advice. 
Studies in several countries have documented that many clients are re-
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ceiving fi nancial advice that is not appropriate for their needs. The level 
of fees charged is another issue. Frequently, fees are not disclosed or 
are not disclosed in a manner that is salient to the client. Because of 
the problems with the quality and cost of fi nancial advice, a number of 
countries are considering reforms of the ways that fi nancial advice is 
provided.
Note
We have received valuable comments and assistance from David Rajnes.
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